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COMMENTS
FREE EXERCISE AND THE ATTORNEY/
PRIEST: THE CLERICAL COLLAR IN THE
COURTROOM
I. Introduction
The circumstances under which a state may constitutionally in-
terfere with an individual's right to the free exercise of his religion'
were limited by the United States Supreme Court in Sherbert v.
Verner2 and Wisconsin v. Yoder.8 These decisions require a state
to demonstrate a compelling interest4 and the unavailability of a
less restrictive alternatives before even an incidental limitation on
free exercise may be justified. Sherbert and Yoder brought new vi-
tality to the free exercise clause and reinstilled in it the Framers'
desire to insure for every individual the right to follow his or her
conscience in religious matters, free from governmental interfer-
ence or coercion.6
1. The first amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in part, that "Con-
gress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exer-
cise thereof . . . ." U.S. CONST. amend I. The free exercise clause was first applied to the
states through the fourteenth amendment in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
2. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
3. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
4. 374 U.S. at 403. See notes 77-92 infra and accompanying text.
5. Id. at 407. In Yoder, Chief Justice Burger delineated the test as follows: "The essence
of all that has been said and written on the subject is that only those interests of the highest
order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise
of religion." Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972). See notes 93-101 infra and ac-
companying text.
6. Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development-Part I,
The Religious Liberty Guarantee, 80 HARV. L. Rav. 1381, 1386 (1967).
The restricted eighteenth century view of both government and religion allowed the
Framers to incorporate into the religion clauses the hope that both church and state could
be protected by separating one from the other. L. TRIsE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §
14-1 at 812 (1978) [hereinafter cited as TIsBE]. See generally M. HOWE, THE GARDEN AND
THE WILDERNESS 1-31 (1965).
The religion clauses can be traced to the influence of three early shapers of American life
and law: Roger Williams, Thomas Jefferson and James Madison. Williams, founder of
Rhode Island and champion of the separation of church and state, believed that separation
was necessary to protect the church from the secular influences of the state. Jefferson, on
the other hand, saw the same separation as a means of protecting the state from the ecclesi-
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One of the more difficult free exercise problems to come to the
courts is the conflict that arises when an attorney who is also an
ordained Roman Catholic priest claims the right to appear before a
criminal jury while wearing his clerical collar. The New York Court
of Appeals in 1975 found that "[tihe risk that a fair trial could not
be had outweighed this incidental limitation" on the attorney's
right of free exercise and forbade him from wearing his collar. The
attorney/priests have continued to litigate the question,8 notwith-
standing this decision. The New York Supreme Court, in Decem-
astical depredations of the church. It was Jefferson who urged the construction of a wall of
separation between church and state. M. HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS 6 (1965).
James Madison's theories on religious freedom fell between those of Williams and Jefferson.
Madison believed that both religion and government would prosper to the fullest extent
possible if relieved of interference from the other but recognized that a certain amount of
interaction was inevitable and probably beneficial. 9 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 487 (G.
Hunt ed. 1910). For a general discussion of the historical influences on the religion clauses,
see the contrasting views of Justice Black, writing for the Court in Everson v. Board of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1954) and Justice Rutledge dissenting in the same case. Also see TRIBE,
supra, §§ 14-2, 14-3; Giannella, supra, at 1386-87. For a discussion of the constitutional
debates concerning the religion clauses, see Freeman, A Remonstrance for Conscience, 106
U. PA. L. REV. 806, 808-13 (1958).
James Madison succinctly described the purpose of the religion clauses on August 15,
1789 during the debates of Congress. The clauses, Madison said, meant "Congress should
not establish a religion, and enforce the legal observation of it by law nor compel man to
worship God in any manner contrary to their conscience." BENTON'S ABRIDGMENT OF THE
DEBATES OF CONGRESS 137 (1857).
Modern commentators have relabeled these two principles "voluntarism" and "separa-
tism." TRIBE, supra, § 14-3 at 818. See also Giannella supra at 1386. Voluntarism is at the
heart of the free exercise clause. The government may not compel matters of faith; an indi-
vidual is free to obey the "inviolability of conscience." Id. Separatism demands state neu-
trality and forbids excessive entanglements of state and religion, most fundamentally for-
bidding government taxation in support of religion. TRIBE, supra, § 14-3 at 819. See
generally J. Madison, Memorial and Remonstrancq Against Religious Assessments, in 2
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 183-91 (G. Hunt ed. 1901).
7. La Rocca v. Lane, 37 N.Y.2d 575, 584, 338 N.E.2d 606, 613, 376 N.Y.S.2d 93, 102
(1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 968 (1976).
8. In re La Rocca, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 23, 1979 at 14, col. 2. (application to appear with client
before grand jury denied); People v. Rodriguez, 101 Misc. 2d 536, 424 N.Y.S.2d 600 (Sup.
Ct. 1979), rev'd sub nom. Matter of Gold, 74 A.D.2d 860, 426 N.Y.S.2d 504 (2d Dep't),
appeal dismissed, 50 N.Y.2d 927, 431 N.Y.S. 2d CXXIII (1980). Despite the many attempts
to litigate the collar question by the attorney/priest, neither res judicata nor collateral es-
toppel apply. In order for res judicata to attach, the same parties must be involved. In the
various suits litigating the collar question, the attorney's clients, New York Supreme Court
justices and the Kings County District Attorney have been the named parties. Similarly,
collateral estoppel requires that the action arise out of the same transaction. The various
suits, however, represent different attempts by the attorney to wear his collar before a jury.
D. SIEGEL, NEW YORK PRACTICE § 443 at 586-87 (1978).
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ber, 1979, granted an application by an attorney/priest to appear
with his collar.' The court found that the risk of prejudice was un-
substantiated by any empirical evidence 0 and moreover, if
prejudice did exist, a rigorous voir dire" coupled with instructions
9. People v. Rodriguez, 101 Misc. 2d 536, 424 N.Y.S.2d 600 (Sup. Ct. 1979), rev'd sub
nom. Matter of Gold, 74 A.D.2d 860, 426 N.Y.S.2d 504 (2d Dep't), appeal dismissed, 50
N.Y.2d 927, 431 N.Y.S.2d CXXIII (1980). New York Supreme Court Justice McShane gave
three reasons why La Rocca, on principles of stare decisis, was not controlling, thus allowing
him to consider the issue de novo. First, the four years since the previous decision have seen
a greater incursion of clergy into secular life and a concomitant lessening of both prejudice
against them and respect for them in the public mind. Second, the court of appeals has
stated that "the doctrine of stare decisis does not, of course, demand unyielding resignation
to even recent precedent." Higby v. Mahoney, 48 N.Y.2d 15, 18, 396 N.E.2d 183, 184, 421
N.Y.S.2d 35, 36 (1979). Finally, "[i]nvitations to judicial reconsideration carry more weight
when addressed to constitutional issues because of the very great difficulty of effecting
change by constitutional amendment." Id. at 18, 396 N.E.2d at 184, 421 N.Y.S.2d at 36.
Furthermore, the court pointed to the Supreme Court's decision in McDaniel v. Paty, 435
U.S. 618 (1978), written after LaRocca, which held unconstitutional a provision of the Ten-
nessee constitution barring ministers of any denomination from serving in the legislature.
The decision also reaffirmed that "only those interests of the highest order and those not
otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion." Id. at
628 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972)).
10. People v. Rodriguez, 101 Misc. 2d 536, 545, 424 N.Y.S.2d 600, 606 (Sup. Ct. 1979).
11. Id. at 542-44, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 605. Voir dire consists of the questioning of prospec-
tive jurors prior to trial for the general purpose of ensuring their impartiality. Questioning is
conducted by the trial judge or the attorneys or some combination thereof depending upon
the jurisdiction. Federal judges have been given exclusive control over voir dire since 1944.
FED. R. Civ. P. 47(a); FED. R. CEIM. P. 24(a). See G. BERMANT, CONDUCT OF THE VOIR DIRE
EXAMINATION: PRACTICES AND OPINIONS OF THE FEDERAL DISTRICT JUDGES (1977). In New
York, voir dire is conducted by attorneys. N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW § 4107 (McKinney 1963);
N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 270.15(1) (McKinney 1971). For a table listing each state and its
voir dire procedure, see J. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES 282 (1977).
If bias or prejudice is discovered as a result of questioning, the juror may be challenged
for cause, or stricken from the panel. There are two types of challenges: challenges for cause
and peremptory challenges. An attorney may challenge for cause, if he can prove to the
court's satisfaction a juror's bias. Challenges for cause are unlimited in number.
In order to strike a particular juror without necessarily proving bias, an attorney may use
a peremptory challenge. These are often used when an attorney believes, but may not be
able to prove, that a particular juror will be hostile to his client. The obvious advantage of
peremptory challenges is that no bias must be shown; the juror is simply removed from the
panel. The disadvantage is that peremptory challenges are limited in number, the actual
number depending upon the jurisdiction and the type of proceeding.
Peremptory challenges have been used to strike all members of a racial, ethnic or religious
group from venires. The Supreme Court has held, however, that elimination by peremptory
challenge of all members of a particular racial or ethnic group from the venire is not a denial
of due process unless the practice is found to be systematic and deliberate. Swain v. Ala-
bama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965). A number of states have held that the elimination by peremp-
tory challenge of all members of a racial or ethnic group is a denial of due process. Coin-
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to the jury would neutralize such prejudice." This decision has
been reversed by the appellate division. s
This Comment will examine the Supreme Court's free exercise
analysis and its application, and will argue that the New York
courts have undercut the spirit of Sherbert 1) by their willingness
to accept, without exhaustive analysis, state interests as sufficiently
compelling to overcome free exercise rights and 2) by their failure




The United States Supreme Court, in Reynolds v. United
monwealth v. Soares, 387 N.E.2d 499, 508-18 (Mass. 1979); People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d
258, 262-78, 583 P.2d 748, 752-62, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 893-903 (1978).
In federal court, both the prosecution and defense are given twenty peremptory chal-
lenges in a trial for a capital offense. If the offense is punishable by imprisonment for more
than a year, the prosecution is given six peremptory challenges and the defense ten. If the
offense is punishable by imprisonment of less than a year or by a fine, each side receives
three peremptory challenges. FED. R. CriM. P. 24(b). In a federal civil trial, each side is
allowed three challenges. 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (1966).
In a New York criminal trial, both prosecution and defense get from 10 to 20 peremptory
challenges depending on the classification of the offense committed. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §
270.25(2) (McKinney 1971). In a civil trial, plaintiff and defendant each receive three per-
emptory challenges. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 4109 (McKinney Supp. 1979). For a table listing
each state and the number of peremptory challenges in various proceedings, see J. VAN
DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES 282 (1977).
12. 101 Misc. 2d at 542-44, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 605.
13. Matter of Gold, 74 A.D.2d 860, 426 N.Y.S.2d 504 (2d Dep't), appeal dismissed, 50
N.Y.2d 927, 431 N.Y.S.2d CXXIII (1980). After Justice McShanegranted the application of
the attorney/priest to wear his collar, the district attorney filed a petition with the appellate
division under article 78 of the New York Civil Practice Laws and Rules to prohibit the
justice from enforcing his order regarding the collar. Article 78 is available both to restrain
unwarranted assumption of jurisdiction and to prevent a court from exceeding its author-
ized powers in a proceeding over which it has jurisdiction. LaRocca v. Lane, 37 N.Y.2d 575,
578-79, 338 N.E.2d 606, 609, 376 N.Y.S.2d 93, 97 (1975). See Wolfram, The "Ancient and
Just" Writ of Prohibition in New York, 52 COLUM. L. REv. 334, 338-53 (1952).
The appellate division granted the article 78 petition and prohibited Justice McShane
from permitting the attorney to wear his clerical collar before a jury. The court found that it
was inappropriate for Justice McShane to have reviewed the decision denying the attorney's
request to wear his collar before the grand jury. In addition, the court found no changed
circumstances which would have allowed the justice to have decided in contravention of
LaRocca v. Lane. 74 A.D.2d at 860, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 504. The attorney/priest has filed suit
in federal court. LaRocca v. Gold, No. 80 Civ. 0431, (E.D.N.Y.).
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States,14 reviewed the conviction of a Mormon who had violated a
Federal statute banning polygamy. In its first interpretation of the
free exercise clause of the first amendment, 5 the Court held that
the free exercise clause did not protect a polygamist even though
the practice was found to be an integral part of the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints. 6 The Court found that the free
exercise clause deprived Congress of all legislative power to inter-
fere with "mere opinion" or beliefs, but left Congress free to pro-
hibit practices or action "which were in violation of social duties or
subversive of good order.' 7 In Reynolds, the Supreme Court cre-
ated the belief/action distinction which forbids absolutely govern-
mental interference with religious beliefs or opinions but reserves
to Congress the right to prohibit certain religious actions which are
deemed disruptive of social order, such as the Mormon practice of
polygamy.' 8
When confronted with free exercise claims, courts have often
14. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
15. There were only four Supreme Court cases decided prior to Reynolds construing the
religious liberty clauses: Terret v. Taylor, 13 U.S. 43 (1815) (allowing a formerly established
church to reclaim its land after the Revolution did not violate either the establishment or
the free exercise clauses); Vidal v. Mayor of Philadelphia, 43 U.S. 127 (1844) (provision of
Pennsylvania constitution guaranteeing freedom of religion-was intended to extend to all
sects whether or not Christian in nature); Permoli v. Municipality of New Orleans, 44 U.S.
588 (1845) (United States Constitution did not protect citizens of the states from state regu-
lation of religion); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679 (1871) (where the right of property is a
matter of church doctrine and has been decided by the church's highest tribunal, a civil
court must accept that decision as conclusive).
16. 98 U.S. at 161-64. The practice of polygamy was not merely a tenet of the Mormon
Church but was an affirmative duty of male members. In response to the Supreme Court's
decision in Late Corp. of the Church of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1
(1890), which disenfranchised-the Church because of its continued adherence to polygamy,
the Mormon spiritual leader issued a proclamation professing the desire of the Church to
obey the -law of the land. He thereupon announced the abandonment of the practice of
polygamy. Note, Toward a Constitutional Definition of Religion, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1056,
1062 n.40 (1978). See generally Linford, The Mormons and the Law: The Polygamy Cases
(pts. 1-2), 9 UTAH L. REV. 308, 543 (1964-65).
17. 98 U.S. at 164. For support of this interpretation of the free exercise clause, the
Court looked to a letter written by Jefferson in which he praised the new Constitution for
restoring to man all his natural rights, so long as these natural rights were not in opposition
to social duties. Id. See generally S. HOOK, PARADOXES IN FREEDOM 6 (1962).
18. CantwelU v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) provides the classic modern formulation
of the distinction: "The [First] Amendment embraces two concepts,-freedom to believe
and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be.
Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society." Id. at 303-04.
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seized upon the belief/action distinction as an expeditious means
of disposing of the matter. Since religious interests invariably can
be considered "action," 19 the belief/action analysis has allowed
courts to begin with the supposition that a religious practice may
be infringed with impunity if a state interest so requires. 0 Creat-
ing a distinction between belief and action leaves open the possi-
bility that any external manifestation of religion, no matter how
innocuous or how fundamental to the religion, is susceptible to
governmental interference. Critics have found the belief/action dis-
tinction more apparent than real. Justice Brennan, concurring in
McDaniel v. Paty,21 found that for purposes of defining the protec-
tion afforded by the free exercise clause, no sharp distinction can
be made between religious belief and religiously motivated ac-
tion." Professor Laurence Tribe has pointed out that the first
amendment refers on its face to the exercise of religion and thus
the constitutional protection thereby afforded would seem to ex-
tend on its own terms beyond mere belief.23
19. See, e.g., McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978) (status as minister found to be ac-
tion); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (refusal by Seventh-Day Adventist to work on
Sabbath deemed action).
20. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (upheld statutory ban on the public
sale of periodicals when applied to minor Jehovah's Witnesses distributing religious pam-
phlets on the public streets); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (upheld convic-
tion of Mormon polygamist despite finding that polygamy was accepted doctrine of Mormon
Church); Gray v. Gulf, M. & 0. R.R., 429 F.2d 1064 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
1001 (1971) (discharge of employee for refusal on religious grounds to pay union dues did
not violate first amendment); State ex rel. Swann v. Pack, 527 S.W.2d 99 (Tenn. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 954 (1976) (granted injunction against handling snakes as part of religious
services).
21. 435 U.S. 618, 629 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring).
22. Id. at 631 n.2. To demonstrate the tenuous distinction between religious belief and
action, Justice Brennan recalled Oliver Cromwell's directive to the Irish regarding religious
liberty:
As to freedom of conscience, I meddle with no man's conscience; but if you mean by
that, liberty to celebrate the Mass, I would have you understand that in no place
where the power of the Parliament of England prevails shall that be permitted."
Quoted in S. Hook, Paradoxes in Freedom 23 (1962).
Id.
23. TRIBE, supra note 6, § 14-8 at 838 n.13. Professor Tribe further notes that despite
the frequent references to the absolute protection afforded religious beliefs, one court has
upheld the dismissal of a school bus supervisor whose religious beliefs admitted the possibil-
ity of the mass murder of school children. Id. at 839. Hollon v. Pierce, 257 Cal. App. 2d 468,
470, 64 Cal. Rptr. 808, 810 (1967). The Hollon court stated that the dismissal was not based
on the religious beliefs themselves but rather on what those beliefs indicated about the state
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In spite of these criticisms, the Supreme Court in McDaniel v.
Paty,24 again relied on the belief/action distinction. In McDaniel, a
Tennessee minister asserted that his right to free exercise had
been infringed by the constitution of that state which forbade min-
isters of any denomination from serving in the state legislature.
The Supreme Court observed that McDaniel had been disqualified
by the Tennessee Supreme Court because of his status as a minis-
ter. 5 Status, said the Supreme Court, is part of action or conduct,
rather than belief, and thus was not absolutely protected as a be-
lief would be.2  Nevertheless, the Court held that this particular
conduct was protected because the state could offer no compelling
reason for its infringement.2 As to the belief/action distinction,
the Court warned that owing to the absolute protection awarded
belief, a court should be cautious in expanding the scope of that
protection lest a state be powerless to vindicate a compelling
interest.28
Overreliance on the belief/action distinction created a climate
whereby substantial religious interests were being curtailed when
courts had found first, that the interests were action and thereby
susceptible to state interference, and second, that a state regula-
tion was arguably designed to protect the public good. Utilizing
this analysis, the Kentucky Court of Appeals upheld a state vacci-
nation requirement despite the plaintiff's religious belief against
injecting foreign substances into the body.2 9 Other courts have af-
firmed convictions of faith healers practicing medicine without a
license,3 persons handling snakes as an element of religious cere-
of the supervisor's mind. Id. at 476-78, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 812-14. Nevertheless, the decision
demonstrates the court's willingness to infringe a person's right to pure religious belief
where that belief is sufficiently heinous.
Another commentator believes that the belief/action distinction often allows state courts
to end their analysis and accept any rational state interest after finding that the relevant
religious interest is action as opposed to belief. Dodge, The Free Exercise of Religion: A
Sociological Approach, 67 MICH. L. Rav. 679, 681 (1969).
24. 435 U.S. 618 (1978).
25. Id. at 627.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 628-29.
28. Id. at 627 n.7.
29. Mosier v. Barren County Bd. of Health, 308 Ky. 829, 215 S.W.2d 967 (1948). See also
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
30. State v. Verbon, 167 Wash. 140, 8 P.2d 1083 (1932). See also People v. Handzik, 410
Ill. 295, 102 N.E.2d 340 (1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 927 (1952).
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moniess and Jehovah's Witnesses who had allowed their children
to sell religious literature in violation of state child labor laws."8
B. Sherbert v. Verner
In a sharp departure from prior case law, the Supreme Court in
Sherbert v. Verner," rejected the notion that any colorable state
interest was sufficient to overcome a free exercise claim."4 Adell
Sherbert, a Seventh-Day Adventist, had refused to work on Satur-
day when her plant extended its work week to six days. She was
discharged for her refusal to work and when she was unable to find
other acceptable employment, she applied for unemployment com-
pensation benefits under the South Carolina Unemployment Com-
pensation Act. Her application was denied on the ground that she
had "failed, without good cause . . . to accept available suitable
work."85 The South Carolina Supreme Court upheld the denial of
benefits and found that there had been no restriction on Sherbert's
right of free exercise of religion by the statute.36
The Supreme Court, in a decision by Justice Brennan, held that
any incidental burden37 on the free exercise of religion would have
31. State v. Massey, 229 N.C. 734, 51 S.E.2d 179, appeal dismissed sub noma. Bunn v.
North Carolina, 336 U.S. 942 (1949); Kirk v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 839, 44 S.E.2d 409
(1947); Lawson v. Commonwealth, 291 Ky. 437, 164 S.W.2d 972 (1942).
32. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
33. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
34. See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961), in which the Court accepted the state's
desire to have a uniform day of rest as sufficient to withstand a free exercise challenge
brought by an Orthodox Jewish merchant who closed his store on Saturday as his religion
required and who then was required by Pennsylvania law to close the store on Sunday as
well. Id. at 601.
35. 374 U.S. at 401.
36. 240 S.C. 286, 303-04, 125 S.E.2d 737, 746 (1962).
37. Prior to Sherbert, only in the case of a direct burden (conflict between specific reli-
gious tenets and adherence to the law), would the court consider there to be sufficient gov-
ernmental coercion to give rise to first amendment protection. An indirect burden, creating
only a loss of social or economic benefits, was not considered the sort of burden which gave
rise to first amendment protection. Sherbert changed the analysis to inquire whether the
state was imposing any burden on the free exercise of religion. South Carolina had not told
Adell Sherbert that she was prohibited from performing her spiritual obligations as a Sev-
enth-Day Adventist to observe Saturday as a day of rest. Rather, she was informed that if
she refused to work on Saturday she could not receive unemployment benefits. Neverthe-
less, the Supreme Court found the withholding of unemployment benefits under the circum-
stances to be a burden on the free exercise of religion. But cf. Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley
Auth., 480 F. Supp. 608 (E.D. Tenn. 1979) (flooding of allegedly sacred Indian land by new
reservoir found not coercive of free exercise rights).
FREE EXERCISE
to be justified by a "compelling state interest" if it were to survive
constitutional scrutiny."8 In addition, even if a compelling state in-
terest were shown, the Court stated that it would be incumbent
upon the state "to demonstrate that no alternative forms of regula-
tion would combat such abuses without infringing First Amend-
ment rights."' 9
In Wisconsin v. Yoder,'0 the Supreme Court, relying on Sher-
bert, upheld the right of the Old Order Amish to keep their chil-
dren out of school after the eighth grade, despite a Wisconsin stat-
ute compelling attendance until age sixteen."1 The Amish believed
their children's attendance at public high school was contrary to
their religion and way of life.'2 Despite the fundamental interest of
the state in the education of children,' the Supreme Court found
that the interest could not justify such a substantial interference
with the free exercise rights of the Amish. The Court concluded
that such a substantial interference could result in the destruction
of their religious beliefs."
For a discussion of possible burdens on free exercise, see Shetreet, Exemptions and Privi-
leges on Grounds of Religion and Conscience, 62 Ky. L.J. 377, 378-91 (1974).
38. The requirement of a compelling state interest is yet another ramification of Justice
Stone's renowned footnote in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53
n.4 (1938), calling for strict judicial scrutiny where government action threatens fundamen-
tal rights. Justice Brennan in NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963), stated: "The
decisions of this Court have consistently held that only a compelling state interest in the
regulation of a subject within the State's constitutional power to regulate can justify limit-
ing First Amendment freedoms." Sherbert extended this requirement to cases involving the
free exercise clause.
39. 374 U.S. at 407. See generally Note, Less Drastic Means and the First Amendment,
78 YALE L.J. 464 (1969). See notes 93-101 infra and accompanying text.
40. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
41. Id. at 234.
42. The Amish wished to instill in their children the virtues of their rural life, in har-
mony with nature and the soil. This way of life emphasized "learning-through-doing" and
opposed materialism, competition and intellectualism. 406 U.S. at 217.
43. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971) (state statutes providing direct aid
to parochial schools violate the fourteenth amendment); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S.
483, 493 (1954) (segregated public schools violate the fourteenth amendment); Pierce v. So-
ciety of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925) (voided statute making parents criminally liable for
not sending children to public school).
44. 406 U.S. at 218-19. The free exercise clause would have extremely limited utility if
its protection becomes available only when the actual destruction .of a religion is imminent.
Rare are the circumstances where all the members of a given religion live in such close
proximity that a single statute or regulation can be found to have potentially the same
destructive effect that the compulsory education requirement would have had on the Amish.
1980]
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While acknowledging Sherbert as a progressive milestone in the
protection of free exercise rights, a number of commentators have
criticized the Sherbert analysis for introducing a "new range of
complexity" into the free exercise area."5 The criticism centers on
the Court's creation of an ad hoc balancing test without supplying
guidelines to impart predictability and coherence.4 In Sherbert,
the Court dismissed the idea that a rational relationship between a
regulation infringing someone's free exercise rights and some color-
able state interest would be sufficient to ensure the regulation's
constitutionality.47 For the first time, the Supreme Court recog-
nized "a duty to weigh the damage to an individual's freedom of
conscience against the harm to the state's legislative scheme.' 48
But the Court failed to delineate the factors to be considered when
lower courts participated in the balancing process. As a result,
state and lower federal courts have often allowed the wide discre-
tion inherent in this unguided balancing to undermine the strong
free exercise thrust of Sherbert. e
To combat this deficiency in Sherbert, one commentator has
proposed that in analyzing a free exercise claim a court should
Generally, governmental intrusions into the practices and beliefs of a religion are more sub-
tle. The free exercise clause must be available to protect against less drastic infringements
on religious liberty as well. See Frank v. State, 604 P.2d 1068 (Alaska 1979) (shooting of
moose for use as "the centerpiece of the most important ritual" in Alaska Indian tribe's life
outweighed state's interest in enforcing game laws); People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 710, 394
P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964) (where ritual use of peyote was "sine qua non" of religion,
exemption from state drug laws was proper). But see State ex rel. Swann v. Pack, 527
S.W.2d 99 (Tenn. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 954 (1976), where a court upheld a regulation
against snake-handling even while acknowledging that the regulation would probably result
in the destruction of the religion.
45. Clark, Guidelines for the Free Exercise Clause, 83 HARV. L. REV. 327, 329 (1969).
See also Dodge, The Free Exercise of Religion: A Sociological Approach, 67 MICH. L. REV.
679, 681-87 (1969); Giannella, supra note 6 at 1381-86.
46. Clark, supra note 45 at 329.
47. See notes 33-39 supra and accompanying text.
48. Clark, supra note 45 at 329.
49. See Mullaney v. Woods, 97 Cal. App. 3d 710, 158 Cal. Rptr. 902 (1979) (state's inter-
est in maintaining integrity of welfare system was sufficiently compelling to counterbalance
free exercise rights of mother who believed social security numbers were "the mark of the
beast"); Johnson v. Motor Vehicle Div., Dep't of Revenue, 593 P.2d 1363 (Colo. 1979)
(state's interest in requiring photograph on driver's licenses for identification purposes out-
weighed individuals' religious beliefs forbidding "likenesses" of them to be made); State ex
rel. Swann v. Pack, 527 S.W.2d 99 (Tenn. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 954 (1976) (state's
compelling interest in abating nuisances justified the prohibition 'against snake-handling as
a part of religious ceremonies).
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measure three elements of the governmental interest: first, the im-
portance of the secular value underlying the governmental regula-
tion; second, whether the regulation is shaped to meet that inter-
est; and third, the impact that religious exemptions would have on
the regulatory plan. After evaluating the governmental interest in
the foregoing manner, the court would then balance that against
the religious interest measured in the following three ways: first,
the sincerity of the claimant; second, the importance of the reli-
gious practice; and finally, the extent of the governmental interfer-
ence with that practice.50
Some courts have, to a degree, implicitly adhered to the com-
mentator's suggestions"1 while others, attempting to "balance" the
government's and the religious interest in an ad hoc manner, have
fallen into some of the traps anticipated by the commentators.
2
C. Present Free Exercise Analysis
To analyze a free exercise challenge to a governmental regula-
tion, a court must examine the following factors: first, is the system
of beliefs espoused by the claimant a religion and therefore within
the ambit of first amendment protection; second, assuming that
the system of beliefs is determined to be a religion, has the govern-
ment placed a burden on the free exercise of the religion; and
finally, what is the importance or centrality of the belief which is
being infringed. The centrality factor has two aspects which re-
quire examination: first, the centrality of the belief to the religion,
and second, the centrality of the belief to the individual bringing
the challenge.
In any free exercise analysis, the threshold determination must
be whether the system of beliefs on the basis of which a litigant is
claiming first amendment protection is a religion, thus qualifying
for first amendment protection."3 The courts have struggled with
50. Giannella, supra note 6, at 1390.
51. See Brown v. Dade Christian Schools, Inc., 556 F.2d 310, 314 (5th Cir. 1977)
(Goldberg, J., concurring), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1063 (1978); Stevens v. Berger, 428 F.
Supp. 896 (E.D.N.Y. 1977); Frank v. State, 604 P.2d 1068 (Alaska 1979).
52. See note 45 supra and accompanying text.
53. Chief Justice Burger, in Wisconsin v. Yoder, emphasized that if a similar belief es-
pousing insulation from contemporary society had a secular philosophical foundation rather
than a religious one, it would not receive first amendment protection. 406 U.S. at 216. Other
courts have used this analysis to find interests asserted as religious to be secular or philo-
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the question of what is a religion 4 and the question will undoubt-
edly continue to puzzle courts as more Americans move away from
organized theistic religions. 6
Once it has been determined that a system of beliefs is a religion
for the purposes of achieving the protection of the free exercise
clause, the second step is to ask whether the state is imposing a
burden on the free exercise of religion. 6 Sherbert eliminated the
distinction previously made by courts between direct and indirect
burdens.5 After Sherbert, there is no doubt that for the purposes
of showing interference with free exercise, an indirect burden will
be considered to have the same coercive effect as a direct burden.
The third element in a free exercise analysis is the sincerity, or
depth of religious feeling, which is exhibited by the individual
claiming first amendment protection. An inquiry into sincerity
sophical and therefore not deserving of first amendment protection. See Brown v. Dade
Christian Schools, Inc., 556 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1063 (1978)
(plurality opinion) (held that belief in segregation by church school was not religious in
nature). Compare Callahan v. Woods, 479 F. Supp. 621 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (conviction that
social security number was tool of Antichrist found to be secular, philosophical belief) with
Stevens v. Berger, 428 F. Supp. 896 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (belief that social security was tool of
Antichrist found to be religious).
54. See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965) (interpreted language requiring con-
scientious objectors to believe in a Supreme Being to encompass those who have a belief
parallel to that normally filled by God); Malnak v. Yogi, 440 F. Supp. 1284 (D.N.J. 1977),
aff'd, 592 F.2d 197 (3d Cir. 1979) (high school course in transcendental meditation found to
be teaching of religion and therefore prohibited by the establishment clause); Theriault v.
Silber, 453 F. Supp. 254 (W.D. Tex. 1978) (prisoner created Church of the New Song featur-
ing philosophy "do-as-you-please" held not to be a religion). Cf. Note, Toward a Constitu-
tional Definition of Religion, 91 HARv. L. Rav. 1056 (1978) (espousing a bifurcated constitu-
tional definition of religion: narrow for purposes of establishment, broad for purposes of free
exercise).
55. G. MELTON, A DIREcToRy OP RELIGIOUS BODIES IN THE UNITED STATES (1977). The
-author of the directory counted 1,275 primary religious bodies in the United States. Of
those, 599 could be considered to be non-theistic. The term "primary religious body" was
coined to avoid the terms "denomination," "church," "sect," or "cult" all of which may have
opprobrious connotations. For the purposes of the directory, a primary religious body was
defined as a group which claims the exclusive or primary religious affiliation of its members.
It must be a social entity, rather than an individual philosophy or a purely temporary local
organization. In addition, the group had to meet one of the following three criteria: 1) have a
membership of at least 2000; 2) have a membership that crossed state lines; or 3) be a
proponent of a unique point of view on one or more issues vital to its members' lives.
56. The Supreme Court has also characterized this requirement as the need to demon-
strate a "coercive effect" on the practice of religion. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203, 223 (1963).
57. 374 U.S. at 403-04. See note 37 supra and accompanying text.
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often leads into the related subject of the truth or falsity of a par-
ticular belief. The Supreme Court first discussed these questions of
sincerity and truth in United States v. Ballard."' In Ballard, de-
fendants, who were charged with mail fraud, had solicited money
by holding themselves out as divine messengers. Defendants ar-
gued that their actions were protected by the free exercise clause. 9
Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, found that while the ulti-
mate truth of a religious belief is beyond judicial purview because
matters of faith cannot be proved in a court of law,60 the sincerity
with which a religious belief is held is a proper subject for judicial
inquiry. 1 Sincerity, the Court found, is capable of examination by
extrinsic evidence. Utilizing this inquiry into sincerity, the Court
noted that the defendants in Ballard had failed to label their sys-
tem of beliefs a religion until after trial had commenced and chose
not to overturn their convictions on free exercise grounds. 2
58. 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
59. Id. at 80-81.
60. One of the most eloquent expressions of this idea was presented by Justice Jackson
in West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), where he wrote:
[I]f there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high
or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or
other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.
If there are any circumstances which permit an exception, they do not now occur to
Us.
Id. at 642.
61. The religious practices and customs which conflict with a governmental interest are
often those alien to the familiar Judeo-Christian precepts. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (polygamy); Edwards v. Maryland State Fair and Agricultural
Soc'y, 476 F. Supp. 153 (D. Md. 1979) ("sankirtan," the Hare Krishna evangelical ritual
consisting of spreading the truth through solicitation); Stevens v. Berger, 428 F. Supp. 896
(E.D.N.Y. 1977) (belief that social security number is a device of the Antichrist); People v.
Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964) (peyotism); State ex rel. Swann
v. Pack, 527 S.W.2d 99 (Tenn. 1975) cert. denied, 424 U.S. 954 (1976) (snake-handling). It is
with these unfamiliar practices and customs that the temptation to delve into the truth or
falsity is the greatest. Yet if the free exercise clause is to reflect the dynamic changes that
have occurred in American views on religion, theology and individual rights, those are the
practices that must be protected with special vigor.
62. See TRIB, supra note 6, § 14-11 at 861-62, citing Record, 322 U.S., vol. 4 at 1496.
Other free exercise claims have similarly foundered on the issue of sincerity. See United
States v. Kuch, 288 F. Supp. 439 (D.D.C..1968) (drug conviction upheld over free exercise
challenge where "church" recognized the ingestion of LSD as a sacrament, the seal of the
church as a three-eyed toad and the church motto was "Victory over Horseshit"); Theriault
v. Silber, 453 F. Supp. 254 (W.D. Tex. 1978) (prisoner-created Church of the New Song
featuring philosophy of "do-as-you-please" found not to be a religion). But see Loney v.
Scurr, 474 F. Supp. 1186 (S.D. Iowa 1979) (outward manifestation of sincerity sufficient to
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The centrality or importance of a particular religious belief, both
within the religion and to the individual, may be considered a
fourth element of free exercise analysis, though its true importance
as a factor to be weighed is yet to be firmly established. On the one
hand, asking a court to determine the relative importance, that a
particular practice holds within a religion borders dangerously on
the forbidden inquiry into the truth of religious beliefs." On the
other hand, logic argues that if a court is to determine whether it
should carve an exception to a law for a particular religious prac-
tice, it should first be able to analyze the importance of the prac-
tice both within the religion and to its practitioner, lest the govern-
ment be forced to adjust itself to myriad insignificant religious
tenets.
Without announcing or categorizing their efforts, many courts
have closely scrutinized the centrality of the belief, either to the
religion, the individual or both. A prime example is the analysis
undertaken by the Supreme Court in Wisconsin v. Yoder of the
particular religious practice and its place in the Amish religion."
The Court examined in great depth and detail the beliefs of the
Old Order Amish and the importance of the interrelationship be-
tween their rural, non-materialistic way of life and the religion it-
self.65 When the Court found that the Amish religion would be
gravely endangered and possibly destroyed if Amish children were
required to attend public high school, it exempted them from com-
pulsory attendance despite the state's fundamental interest in edu-
cation.6 6 Similarly, the California Supreme Court accepted the cen-
find Church of the New Song a religion); People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40
Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964) (Native American Church with long history of peyote use as an intrinsic
part of worship exempt from law forbidding peyote use). 0
63. If a party, maintaining that a practice is central, enlists clergy or other experts to
testify to that effect and his adversary argues that the practice is merely incidental, also
using expert testimony, the determination of such a dispute would place a court exactly
where it may not be, that is, deciding on the truth or falsity of a religious belief. In 1871, the
Supreme Court in Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 728 (1871), recognized that the "law knows
no heresy, and is committed to the support of no dogma."
64. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
65. Id. at 218.
66. Id. at 234-36. The Court's reliance in Yoder on the three hundred years of Amish
history marked by their continuous rejection of worldly influences and their organized, per-
vasively religious society is troubling in that it seems to apply the protection of the first
amendment only to those religions capable of proving their longevity and constancy of ideol-
ogy. The Constitution, however, was written to protect the iconoclast of both religion, see
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trality of peyote use to members of the Native American Church,
describing peyote as "the sine qua non of defendants' faith. 67
Other federal courts have placed less emphasis on the necessity
of centrality and have accepted a religious belief as within the am-
bit of first amendment protection if the belief is deeply rooted in
the religion. In Stevens v. Berger,6 8 welfare recipients sought ex-
emption from the requirement of obtaining social security numbers
for their children. The parents believed that the numbers were a
device of the Antichrist and would prevent their children from en-
tering heaven. After probing into its theological basis, the district
court judge accepted the belief as sincerely held and genuinely reli-
gious. The court granted the exemption even though the parents'
religion did not espouse any doctrine concerning the Antichrist
and members were encouraged to study the Bible and develop for
themselves a personal understanding of its teachings.6 9 In Teterud
v. Burns7 0 an Indian prisoner brought an action seeking the right
to wear his hair long (in contravention of prison rules) on free ex-
ercise grounds. The Eighth Circuit, finding that a less restrictive
alternative existed to the prison's objections,71 held the regulation
against long hair to be violative of the free exercise clause. More-
over, the prisoner was not required to prove that wearing long
braided hair was an absolute tenet of the Indian religion. Proof
West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 640-42 (1943) and politics, see
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting), from the overbearing
will of the majority. Chief Justice Burger's statement in Yoder that "the very concept of
ordered liberty precludes allowing every person to make his own standards on matters of
conduct in which society as a whole has an important interest" belies this goal of the Consti-
tution. Id. at 215-16.
67. People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 725, 394 P.2d 813, 820, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 76 (1964).
See also Edwards v. Maryland State Fair and Agricultural Soc'y, 476 F. Supp. 153 (D. Md.
1979); Frank v. State, 604 P.2d 1068 (Alaska 1979).
68. 428 F. Supp. 896 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
69. Id. at 901. On similar facts, a California appellate court indicated that where the
belief regarding the social security numbers and the Antichrist was only a strong personal
religious belief and the holder did not belong to any organized religious group, it would not
have recognized that belief as worthy of constitutional protection but for a stipulation to
that effect. Mullaney v. Woods, 97 Cal. App. 3d 710, 158 Cal. Rptr. 902 (1979).
70. 522 F.2d 357 (8th Cir. 1975).
71. Id. at 361. The prison administration argued that the absolute prohibition against
wearing lorig hair was necessary for the following reasons: 1) sanitary food preparation; 2)
safe operation of machinery; 3) easy identification of inmates; 4) security against contra-
band; and 5) the personal cleanliness of inmates.
1980]
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
that the practice was deeply rooted in the religion was sufficient."'
Analyzing the centrality of the practice to the individual, as the
courts did in Stevens and Teterud, is more problematic than ana-
lyzing the centrality of the practice to the religion. It is when the
centrality of the practice to the individual is examined that the
individual's religious freedom clashes most directly with the needs
of society. In Yoder, Chief Justice Burger expressed the fear that
allowing individuals (as opposed to those following the precepts of
organized religions) to set their own standards, even in the matter
of religion, could upset "the very concept of ordered liberty. T7 The
Chief Justice noted that the fabric of society could not withstand
each individual's creating his own law. 4
If the free exercise clause were interpreted to protect important
personal religious beliefs, ordered society would not be left de-
fenseless. Testing the sincerity of an individual's beliefs would
eliminate many who would use the free exercise clause as a shield
for illicit activity or to circumvent governmental regulations.7 6 The
expense and inconvenience of litigation would undoubtedly deter
others. Even if there were a minor increase in fraudulent claims,
this would be a small price to pay for religious liberty. The free
exercise clause was envisioned not only as a protector of religions
but as the guardian against governmental intrusion into personal
religious conviction.7 6 An inquiry into the centrality and impor-
72. 522 F.2d at 360. Cf. Moskowitz v. Wilkinson, 432 F. Supp. 947 (D. Conn. 1977) iJew-
ish inmate allowed to wear beard where practice is not absolute religious requirement but is
deeply rooted in religious doctrine); Geller v. Secretary of Defense, 423 F. Supp. 16 (D.D.C.
1976) (Air Force chaplain allowed to wear beard even though practice was not absolutely
mandated by religion).
73. 406 U.S. at 215.
74. Id. at 215-16.
75. See notes 58-62 supra and accompanying text.
76. See note 6 supra and accompanying text. James Madison wrote in his Memorial and
Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, 2 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 183 (G. Hunt
ed. 1901): "The Religion then of every man must be left to the conviction and conscience of
every man; and it is the right of every man to exercise it as these may dictate. The right is
in its nature an unalienable right." Id. at 184.
One commentator has stated:
The violation of a man's religion or conscience often works an exceptional harm to
him which, unless justified by the most stringent social needs, constitutes a moral
wrong in and of itself, far more than would be the impairment of his fteedom of
speech, press and assembly ... the cost to a principled individual of failing to do his
moral duty is generally severe, in terms of supernatural sanction or the loss of moral
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tance of a particular religious belief to the individual should be-
come a standard element of free exercise analysis.
After a court has thoroughly examined the individual's religious
interest, it remains for the court, first, to determine whether the
state has sustained its burden of demonstrating a compelling inter-
est in order to justify any infringement of free exercise, and, sec-
ond, to ensure that the infringement of free exercise, even if justi-
fied, is effectuated in the least intrusive manner, by application of
the least restrictive alternative doctrine.
The Supreme Court in Sherbert determined that a "compelling
state interest" must be established in order to justify the infringe-
ment on an individual's first amendment rights.77 In Sherbert,
South Carolina asserted that the maintenance of the integrity of
its unemployment benefits program in the face of fraudulent reli-
gious claims was a compelling state interest.78 The Supreme Court
disagreed and added that even if it were a compelling state inter-
est, the state would be required to demonstrate that no alternative
forms of regulation would suffice to combat the perceived abuses7
Both in Yoder 0 and in McDaniel,81 the state's assertions of com-
pelling interest were rejected.8 ' Lower federal courts have had an
opportunity to hear a much wider variety of interests asserted as
compelling and with limited guidance from the Supreme Court,
have arrived at divergent results. Certain types of state interests
have consistently been recognized as compelling." Courts are vir-
tually unanimous in recognizing that there is no free exercise right
self-respect.
Clark, Guidelines for the Free Exercise Clause, 83 HARV. L. REv. 327, 337 (1969).
77. See notes 33-39 supra and accompanying text.
78. 374 U.S. at 407.
79. Id.
80. 406 U.S. 205.
81. 435 U.S. 618.
82. In Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 462 (1971), however, the Supreme Court
found the government's interest in procuring manpower for defense sufficiently compelling
to overcome a free exercise challenge to the draft.
83. These include compulsory vaccination, Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11
(1905); Wright v. DeWitt School Dist., 238 Ark. 906, 385 S.W.2d 644 (1965); McCartney v.
Austin, 57 Misc. 2d 525, 293 N.Y.S.2d 188 (Sup. Ct. 1968), aff'd, 31 A.D.2d 370, 298
N.Y.S.2d 26 (3d Dep't 1969); and drug laws, Native Am. Church of N.Y. v. United States,
468 F. Supp. 1247 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); United States v. Kuch, 258 F. Supp. 439 (D.D.C. 1968);
Gaskin v. Tennessee, 490 S.W.2d 521 (Tenn. 1973).
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to refuse to testify before a grand jury with impunity.84 Even in
this seemingly settled area, it has been stated that the government
must show a compelling interest sufficient to outweigh the possibil-
ity of an infringement of free exercise.8 5
A number of courts have dealt with free exercise rights of both
federal and state prisoners." In the face of prisoners' free exercise
claims, prison officials invariably assert that the compelling state
interest in the maintenance of prison order requires the curtail-
ment of prisoners' free exercise rights. 7 The former practice of
courts was to stifle prisoners' free exercise rights in the name of
prison stability.88 Since Sherbert, however, where prisoners have
requested permission to wear religious garb or hairstyles or to hold
religious services, courts have closely scrutinized the prison admin-
istration's assertion that the denial of prisoners' free exercise rights
84. Smilow v. United States, 465 F.2d 802 (2d Cir. 1972), vacated, 409 U.S. 944 (1973);
People v. Woodruff, 26 A.D.2d 236, 272 N.Y.S.2d 786 (2d Dep't 1966); Matter of Fuhrer, 100
Misc. 2d 315, 419 N.Y.S.2d 426 (Sup. Ct. 1979).
85. Matter of Wood, 430 F. Supp. 41 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). In the grand jury situation, the
least restrictive alternative doctrine should require the state to demonstrate that the sought
after information could not be obtained in any way other than by infringing the free exer-
cise rights of a religious objector.
86. See Jones v. Bradley, 590 F.2d 294 (9th Cir. 1979); Burgin v. Henderson, 536 F.2d
501 (2d Cir. 1975); Mukmuk v. Comm'r of Dep't of Correctional Servs., 529 F.2d 272, (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 911 (1976); Kahane v. Carlson, 527 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1975);
Teterud v. Burns, 522 F.2d 357 (8th Cir. 1975); Theriault v. Silber, 495 F.2d 390 (5th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 871 (1977); Remmers v. Brewer, 494 F.2d 1277 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1012 (1974); Smilow v. United States, 465 F.2d 802 (2d Cir. 1972), vacated,
409 U.S. 944 (1973); Cochran v. Rowe, 438 F. Supp. 566 (N.D. Ill. 1977); Moskowitz v. Wil-
kinson, 432 F. Supp. 947 (D. Conn. 1977); Monroe v. Bombard, 422 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y.
1976); Wilson v. Beame, 380 F. Supp. 1232 (E.D.N.Y. 1974); Brown v. McGinnis, 10 N.Y.2d
531, 180 N.E.2d 791, 225 N.Y.S.2d 497 (1962); Bryant v. Wilkins, 45 Misc. 2d 923, 258
N.Y.S.2d 455 (Sup. Ct. 1965). See also Comment, The Religious Rights of the Incarcerated,
125 U. PA. L. REv. 812 (1977); Note, The Right to Observe Dietary Laws in Prison, 45
FORDHAm L. Rav. 92 (1976).
87. Burgin v. Henderson, 536 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1976) (administration asserted wearing of
beards and prayer hats was unhygienic); St. Claire v. Cuyler, 481 F. Supp. 732 (E.D. Pa.
1979) (warden denied Muslim inmate permission to wear kufi or religious skullcap during
meals on grounds that it breached decorum, that it might have encouraged the wearing of
other unsanitary hats and that it was not polite to eat with a hat on); Wilson v. Beame, 380
F. Supp. 1232 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (state maintained that prison security required it to forbid
segregated prisoners from participating in religious services with non-segregated prisoners).
88. See Brooks v. Wainwright, 428 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1970); Cochran v. Sielaff, 405 F.
Supp. 1126 (S.D. II. 1976); Brown v. McGinnis, 10 N.Y.2d 531, 180 N.E.2d 791, 225
N.Y.S.2d 497 (1962); Bryant v. Wilkins, 45 Misc. 2d 923, 258 N.Y.S.2d 455 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
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is essential to the maintenance of an orderly prison.8
In Palmer v. Board of Education," the state's strong interest in
promoting civic responsibility in grade schools justified the dismis-
sal of a Jehovah's Witness grade school teacher who had refused to
teach patriotism to her class because her religion opposed such
concepts. In other instances, courts have found sufficiently compel-
ling a state's interest in denying people access to an island used by
the United States Navy for target practice 91 and requiring a Sev-
enth-Day Adventist to pay union dues even though he claimed his
religion opposed joining communal organizations."'
The concept of the "least restrictive alternative" was first recog-
nized in the area of the first amendment right to freedom of
speech. 9 The Supreme Court has approved restrictions on the
time, place and manner of speech provided that the restrictions are
justified without reference to the context of the regulated speech.
The restriction must serve a significant governmental interest and
leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the
information." Furthermore, the. restriction must be shaped to pro-
tect the government's legitimate concerns while intruding as little
as possible on individual freedom.' Sherbert explicitly extended
this least restrictive alternative doctrine to the free exercise
clause.96
89. Teterud v. Burns, 522 F.2d 357 (8th Cir. 1975); Monroe v. Bombard, 422 F. Supp.
211 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
90. 603 F.2d 1271 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1026 (1980).
91. United States v. Mowat, 582 F.2d 1194 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 967 (1978).
92. Gray v. Gulf, M. & 0. R.R., 429 F.2d 1064 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 101
(1971). The Seventh-Day Adventists believe that man is a free moral agent. Because every
man must decide individually how he will serve God, a Seventh-Day Adventist should not
join a group, such as a union which might take the power of individual choice away from
him. Id. at 1067 n.4.
93. Schneider v. Town of Irvington, 308 U.S. 147 (1938). See also Talley v. California,
362 U.S. 60 (1960); Teamsters Union v. Vogt, 354 U.S. 284 (1957); Kunz v. New York, 340
U.S. 290 (1951). See Note, Less Drastic Means and the First Amendment, 78 YALE L.J. 464
(1969); Wormuth & Merkin, The Doctrine of the Reasonable Alternative, 9 UTAH L. REV.
254 (1964).
94. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748 (1976).
95. In Schneider v. Town of Irvington, 308 U.S. 147, 162 (1938), the legitimate purposes
of keeping the streets clean was found insufficient to justify an ordinance prohibiting all
public distribution of handbills. See also Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487-90 (1960).
96. 374 U.S. at 407.
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In Sherbert, the South Carolina Employment Security Commis-
sion asserted that allowing a person to receive an exemption from
the requirements of the state unemployment laws on free exercise
grounds would unleash a flood of fraudulent claims.97 The Su-
preme Court found that even if the possibility of spurious claims
did exist, it would be incumbent upon the state to demonstrate
that there were no alternative forms of regulation to combat that
eventuality.'8
Since Sherbert, the least restrictive alternative doctrine has be-
come a necessary component of free exercise analysis. One district
court has held that parents who believed that social security num-
bers were a tool of the Antichrist could have their children identi-
fied in other ways for the purpose of receiving welfare payments. 9"
In Burgin v. Henderson,100 the Second Circuit upheld prisoners'
rights to wear beards and hats, stating: "even if the institutional
purpose is legitimate and substantial . . . that purpose cannot be
pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liber-
ties when the end can be more narrowly achieved." 101
D. Free Exercise in New York
1. La Rocca v. Lane
In La Rocca v. Lane'02 the court of appeals was confronted with
the question whether New York could forbid an attorney who was
also an ordained Roman Catholic priest from wearing his clerical
collar while representing his client before a criminal jury. The
court of appeals held that the wearing of the collar could be consti-
tutionally barred because the right to a fair trial might be jeopard-
ized by the prejudicial effect the clerical garb would have on a
jury.1 .08 In balancing the religious interest of the attorney with the
97. Id.
98. Id. at 407-08.
99. Stevens v. Berger, 428 F. Supp. 896, 907-08 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
100. 536 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1976).
101. Id. at 504 (quoting Sostre v. Preiser, 519 F.2d 763, 764 (2d Cir. 1975)).
102. 37 N.Y.2d 575, 338 N.E.2d 606, 376 N.Y.S.2d 93 (1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 968
(1976).
103. Id. at 577; 338 N.E.2d at 608, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 96. The prejudicial effect was per-
ceived by the court as possibly working in favor of either the defendant or the state. The
benefit to the defendant would derive from the high status accorded clergymen in our soci-
ety and the increased credibility that status affords them. The court also recognized that
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defendant's right to a fair trial, the court found that the state's
paramount judicial duty to insure a fair trial was not outweighed
by the "incidental limitation" on the attorney/priest's right of free
exercise.1"4
The analysis employed by the court of appeals is subject to criti-
cism for a number of reasons. First, the court of appeals stated
that it found the Supreme Court decisions construing the free ex-
ercise clause "not particularly helpful," based on the notion that in
Sherbert and Yoder the state interests, with which a religious
practice conflicted, were not paramount.'08 In Yoder, however, the
state's interest in the education of children, while deemed funda-
mental, did not outweigh the important free exercise interests of
the Amish.106
Second, the court of appeals labelled the wearing of the clerical
collar a "requirement of [the] calling which is not unconditional or
beyond dispensation. " The attorney/priest had argued that the
atavistic prejudice against Catholicism or religion in general could work to the advantage of
the state where it was prosecuting a person whose attorney was a priest. Id. at 583-84, 338
N.E.2d at 613, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 101-02.
104. Id. at 584, 338 N.E.2d at 613, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 102.
105. Id. at 583, 338 N.E.2d at 612, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 101. As to the court's summary treat-
ment of the prior Supreme Court decisions, the supremacy clause, which provides in part
that "this Constitution . . .shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and Judges in every
state shall be bound thereby ...." U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2, and the incorporation of the
free exercise clause into the fourteenth amendment, see note 1 supra, should have made it
clear that the Supreme Court decisions could not have been simply cast aside as not partic-
ularly helpful.
In ruling that a Sunni Muslim appearing in court to have his name changed had the right
to wear his prayer cap, the Rhode Island Supreme Court stated "the free exercise clause of
the first amendment has been held by the United States Supreme Court (citation omitted)
to apply to the states via the fourteenth amendment. Under the supremacy clause of the
federal constitution we are bound to apply this doctrine and to be guided by the Supreme
Court's decisions explicating the free exercise clause." In re Palmer, 386 A.2d 1112, 1114
(R.I. 1978).
Furthermore, Justice Shapiro dissenting in LaRocca v. Lane, 47 A.D.2d 243, 253, 366
N.Y.S.2d 456, 465 (2d Dep't 1975) (Shapiro, J., dissenting), stated that although he was
personally inclined to forbid the attorney from wearing his clerical collar in court, he was
constrained by the Supreme Court's free exercise decisions to find that the attorney's free
exercise rights would be unconstitutionally infringed were he forbidden to wear his collar.
106. See notes 36-40 supra and accompanying text.
107. 37 N.Y.2d at 584, 338 N.E.2d at 613, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 102. The court of appeals
made its determination as to the significance of the clerical collar without any hint of the
source of its information or indication that a thorough examination had been made. Further
research reveals that clerics have been wearing distinctive dress outside of the sanctuary
since the sixth century, when, as the clerics became philosophers and ascetics, they began to
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wearing of the collar was a "continual act of worship."108 Moreover,
he had been given permission to become a lawyer on the condition
he continue to wear his collar. 109 While wearing the collar is con-
sidered a right and obligation of a cleric, it is also a privilege, and
deprivation of that privilege is one punishment for scandalous or
incorrigible behavior. 110
Third, having described the religious practice as "limited" and
finding that a fair trial was a paramount state concern, the court
proceeded to "balance" the religious and governmental interests.
As commentators fearful of the ad hoc balancing test warned, the
result was less a legal determination than a policy decision."'
Finally, the court of appeals chose not to discuss whether there
existed or could be devised a less restrictive alternative 12 to the
total ban on the attorney's wearing his collar before a jury. This
omission of any discussion of a less restrictive alternative is strik-
ing in light of the Supreme Court's decision to make a least restric-
tive alternative inquiry a distinct component of free exercise analy-
sis. The court of appeals' failure to discuss an alternative is also
puzzling because voir dire, the traditional vehicle for neutralizing
adopt the dress of those professions, the pallium or cloak. The Council of Trent, which met
from 1545 to 1563, directed that clerics should dress comfortably and so as to demonstrate
outwardly their uprightness of morals. The wearing of the so-called Roman collar was for-
malized in the United States by the Third Plenary Council of Baltimore in 1884. Interpret-
ing Canon 136 of the Universal Code, the Council decreed that clerics had to wear the Ro-
man collar with a coat of black or somber color at all times while in a public forum. The
pronouncement of the Baltimore Council has never been revoked though some modern cler-
gymen do eschew the wearing of the collar. That certain individual priests have made the
determination that they can fully participate in the clerical life while refraining from wear-
ing the collar (either occasionally or at all times) has no bearing on the significance of the
practice to the Roman Catholic Church or to any other individual. See 3 NEW CATHOLIC
ENCYCLOPEDIA 947 (1967). See generally F. DOLBY, CHURCH VESTMENTS 173 (1868); H.
MCCLOUD, CLERICAL DRESS AND INSIGNIA OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH 73-75 (1948); J.
SHIELDS, DEPRIVATION OF THE CLERICAL GARB 1-9 (1958).
108. Brief for Respondent-Appellant at 4, La Rocca v. Lane, 37 N.Y.2d 575, 584, 338
N.E,2d 606, 376 N.Y.S.2d 93, cert. denied, 424 U.S. 968 (1976).
109. Id. at 3.
110. J. SHIELDS, DEPRIVATION OF THE CLERICAL GARB 7-13 (1958).
111. The perfunctory balancing undertaken by the New York Court of Appeals in La
Rocca undermines the Supreme Court's free exercise standards by reducing a process which
demands an exhaustive weighing of fundamental interests which are in conflict with mere
statements of conclusions. See Clark, Guidelines for the Free Exercise Clause, 83 HARV. L.
REV. 327, 329-44 (1969); Giannella, supra note 6, at 1390-1431.
112. See notes 93-101 supra and accompanying text.
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jury prejudice, could easily have functioned as an effective means
of accommodating both the attorney's right of free exercise and the
state's paramount interest in providing a fair trial."'
Four years after the court of appeals decision in La Rocca v.
Lane, a New York Supreme Court justice granted an application of
the same attorney to wear his clerical collar before a criminal
jury.'" The court in that instance found that the prohibition
against wearing the collar violated the attorney's first amendment
right to the free exercise of his religion and his fourteenth amend-
ment right to equal protection under the laws." 5
Following the analysis of Sherbert and Yoder, Supreme Court
Justice Hugh McShane found the attorney's beliefs were sincerely
held. Convinced of the attorney's sincerity, the court focused on
the centrality of the practice to the individual, rather than on the
position of the practice in the Roman Catholic Church or to the
priesthood at large. The court then determined that there had
been a substantial burden on the attorney/priest's free exercise
rights. In setting out those factors which demonstrated that sub-
stantial burden, the court noted that 1) the priest had been given
permission by his church superiors to become a member of the bar
only on the condition that he continue to wear his collar; 2) he had
worn his collar constantly and consistently throughout his twenty-
nine years as a priest and that his "own intense desire to display
his religious calling is almost palpable and not of such a nature as
to be merely personal vanity;" and 3) the wearing of the collar was
tied to principles and literature of the Roman Catholic Church."'
Finally, the court balanced the interest alleged by the state to be
compelling against the attorney's free exercise rights. The state
maintained that its interest in providing a fair trial should override
113. See section IV infra. Both Justice Mangano in the lower court, La Rocca v. Lane,
77 Misc. 2d 123, 353 N.Y.S.2d 867 (1974), and Justice Shapiro, dissenting in the appellate
division, 47 A.D.2d 243, 255, 366 N.Y.S.2d 456, 465 (2d Dep't 1975) (Shapiro, J., dissenting),
found voir dire to be an effective remedy against the possibility of prejudice engendered by
the wearing of the collar. Judge Gabrielli dissented in the court of appeals, deferring to the
"well reasoned" dissenting opinion of Justice Shapiro in the appellate division. La Rocca v.
Lane, 37 N.Y.2d 575, 585, 338 N.E.2d 606, 613, 376 N.Y.S.2d 93, 103 (1975), cert. denied,
424 U.S. 968 (1976).
114. People v. Rodriguez, 101 Misc. 2d 536, 424 N.Y.S.2d 600 (2d Dep't 1979). See notes
8-13 supra.
115. Id. at 544-48, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 606-08.
116. Id. at 544-45, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 606.
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the attorney's interest in wearing his clerical collar in court. Justice
McShane found the state's conclusion that providing a fair trial
would be made impossible by allowing the wearing of the collar
"unsubstantiated by any empirical evidence. '117 Moreover, if
prejudice did exist, the court found no reason why voir dire, cou-
pled with instructions to the jury, would not sufficiently eliminate
prejudice in that situation as it does in others. 8
2. Free Exercise and the Judicial Process
A number of courts in New York have confronted the conflict
between religious freedom and the judicial process. These cases
have considered the question of exemption, on free exercise
grounds, from testifying before a grand jury and the rights of wit-
nesses and parties to appear in court dressed in clerical and reli-
gious garb.
In People v. Woodruff,/" a witness was held in contempt for her
refusal to testify before a grand jury on the ground that her un-
named religion (said to be akin to Hinduism) did not allow her to
give testimony that might bring harm to others.2 Witnesses ex-
pert in Eastern religions testified that devotees of Hinduism do
hold such beliefs. Despite its finding that the contemnor was sin-
cere in her belief and that if forced to testify her religious freedom
would be infringed, the court nevertheless held that the state's in-
terest in "every man's evidence" outweighed the individual
right.121
A series of decisions after LaRocca have considered the rights of
trial participants other than attorneys to appear in court wearing
religious attire. In Close-it Enterprises, Inc. v. Weinberger,121 the
117. Id. at 545, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 606.
118. Id. at 542-44, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 605-07.
119. 26 A.D.2d 236, 272 N.Y.S.2d 786 (2d Dep't 1966).
120. Id. at 237, 272 N.Y.S.2d at 787-88.
121. Id. at 238-39, 272 N.Y.S.2d at 789-90. A refusal to give testimony in a grand jury
proceeding on religious grounds has never been accepted. See Smilow v. United States, 465
F.2d 802 (2d Cir. 1972); In re Rabbinical Seminary Netzach Israel Ramailis, 450 F. Supp.
1078 (E.D.N.Y. 1978); Matter of Fuhrer, 100 Misc. 2d 315, 419 N.Y.S.2d 426 (Sup. Ct. 1979).
But cf. Matter of Wood, 430 F. Supp. 41 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (court indicated that even a grand
jury is subject to the necessity of showing compelling state interest).
122. 64 A.D.2d 686, 407 N.Y.S.2d 587 (2d Dep't 1978). For other cases involving the
wearing of religious garb in the courtroom, see In re Palmer, 386 A.2d 1112 (R.I. 1978)
(Sunni Muslim voluntarily in court to effect change of name had free exercise right to wear
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appellate division reversed a lower court and ordered a new trial
where the trial judge had required the defendant, an Orthodox
Jew, to remove his yarmulke in court. The defendant refused and
excluded himself from the courtroom. The jury returned a verdict
for the plaintiff within minutes.""
In ordering a new trial, the unanimous court stated:
The defendant should not have been placed in the situation of having to
choose between protecting his legal interest or violating an essential element
of his faith. . . . In any event, any potential prejudice could have been
taken care of through 'the voir dire and the court's instructions to the
jury.'24
The court stated that.there was no reason to believe that a fair
trial could not be provided if the defendant wore a yarmulke. In
distinguishing La Rocca, the court stated that La Rocca was lim-
ited to situations where an attorney appearing in religious garb
sought to represent an individual in court.1 5
When a person whose own property or liberty is at stake is ex-
cluded from the courtroom on the ground of wearing religious garb,
the quantum of possible direct prejudice is much greater than
when an individual's attorney is similarly excluded. Nevertheless,
that does not mean that an attorney leaves his free exercise rights
at the courthouse door or that an attorney's free exercise rights
may be ignored. 1" 6 What should be drawn from Close-it is the be-
prayer cap during proceeding); McMillan v. State, 258 Md. 147, 265 A.2d 453 (1970) (re-
versed contempt citation of prisoner who refused to remove ritual head covering known as
filass during arraignment).
Two Orthodox Jewish males who wished to observe the denaturalization proceeding con-
ducted against an accused war criminal were excluded from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois solely on the ground that they refused to remove their
yarmulkes. They brought an action to bar the United States Marshall from excluding per-
sons wearing religious attire from attending court proceedings as spectators. The dispute
was resolved when the United States Marshall agreed to an order prohibiting him from
excluding any person wearing apparel or symbols which communicate the content of his or
her religious beliefs. Gassell v. Adams, Doc. No. 78 C 2120 (N.D. Ill., Nov. 30, 1978) (final
agreed order).
123. 64 A.D.2d at 686, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 588.
124. Id. at 686-87, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 588.
125. Id.
.126. One element of the court of appeals' reasoning in La Rocca v. Lane was that an
attorney's wearing a clerical collar in a courtroom was improper from the standpoint of
courtroom decorum. A trial judge has nearly total control over the order and behavior of his
courtroom. See People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin, 248 N.Y. 465, 162 N.E. 487 (1928). The New
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lief that even if the possibility of prejudice exists, it can be reme-
died through the use of voir dire and limiting instructions to the
jury.127
Two New York Supreme Court cases have considered the prob-
lem of prosecution witnesses wearing clerical attire.128 Both cases
involve priests, one Catholic, the other Episcopal, who wanted to
testify as complainant-witnesses. In each instance, defense motions
to prohibit testimony while the witnesses were in clerical attire
were denied on the grounds that 1) the priests' right of free exer-
cise would be violated and 2) if there were prejudice, it could be
"circumvented by a carefully practiced voir dire coupled with
strong limiting instruction to the jury on the witnesses credibil-
ity.""" It is apparent from Close-it, Drucker, and Ramirez that
voir dire can neutralize religious prejudice created by the wearing
of clerical or religious attire by witnesses or parties to the action.
The extension of this procedure to attorneys will protect both the
York courts have specifically stated, however, that such control is not absolute; it may be
limited where a judge has abused his discretionary power to control courtroom behavior. In
Peck v. Stone, 32 A.D.2d 506, 304 N.Y.S.2d 881 (4th Dep't 1969), the court overruled a trial
judge who refused to continue a trial in which a woman attorney had appeared in a mini-
skirt. The Fourth Department found that the woman had behaved respectfully at all times
and that it could not be said as a matter of law that her dress was unsuitable, unconven-
tional or inappropriate. Id. at 507, 304 N.Y.S.2d at 883.
Free exercise interests have prevailed where trial participants other than attorneys have
appeared in clerical or religious dress. See note 122 supra and accompanying text. The real
issue, therefore, may not be the maintenance of a fair trial, but rather the extent of a judge's
discretionary power to command the proper decorum and behavior of attorneys. If the ques-
tion is reduced to a matter of courtroom decorum and judicial discretion, it is arguable that
these interests are not sufficiently compelling so as to justify the infringement of substantial
free exercise rights.
127. 64 A.D.2d at 687, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 588.
128. People v. Drucker, 100 Misc. 2d 91, 418 N.Y.S.2d 744 (Crim. Ct. 1979); People v.
Ramirez, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 11, 1979 at 12, col. 2. The Epsicopal priest in Drucker had been the
victim of an assault by a taxi driver at LaGuardia Airport. The Drucker court distinguished
La Rocca on the ground that it involved an attorney and that the decision was therefore
based on the judge's authority to dictate an attorney's attire insofar as it reasonably relates
to the attorney's proper function before the court. 100 Misc. 2d at 93, 418 N.Y.S. at 745.
Finding the resolution of such problems of prejudice to be the purpose of the New York
system of extensive voir dire, the court noted that "(w]e are satisfied that the resort to an
extensive voir dire and a strong charge will most clearly set the tone and leave no substan-
tial abridgment of this defendant's rights." Id. at 96, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 747.
The Catholic priest in Ramirez had witnessed the defendant climbing a church fence in
Brooklyn. The defendant Ramirez was later charged with assault, burglary, grand larceny
and possession of stolen property.
129. People v. Ramirez, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 11, 1979 at 12, col. 2.
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attorneys' free exercise rights and the state's ability to provide a
fair trial.
III. Constitutional Conflicts
There is little doubt that providing a fair trial is a compelling
state interest.5 0 The requirement of a fair trial in Anglo-American
law can be traced back as far as the Magna Charta. " I The very
words of the sixth amendment guarantee a defendant the right to
be tried by an impartial jury,8 2 and the due process clauses of the
fifth and fourteenth amendments have established what constitues
a "fair trial" under the Constitution. " '
In LaRocca, Chief Judge Breitel characterized the necessity of
providing a fair trial as "the State's paramount duty" and as "a
paramount constitutional condition.' ' 3 4 Whether the duty of pro-
viding a fair trial is labelled "compelling" or "paramount" or "fun-
damental" is of little import. Providing a fair trial stands among
those few governmental functions without which there would be no
society to govern. The government must enforce the law, but it
must simultaneously guarantee to those accused of breaking the
law every possible procedural safeguard against arbitrary or unfair
state action. In view of its importance to our system of justice, a
fair trial must be considered a state interest which would prevail
were it to collide with the "preferred" but not absolute right of an
individual to the free exercise of his religion. 3 5 In the context of
130. The Supreme Court has called the right to a fair trial "[t]he most fundamental of
all freedoms. . . ." Estes v. Texas, 382 U.S. 532, 540 (1965).
131. Article 39 of the Magna Charta states "[n]o free man shall be taken or imprisoned
or disseised or outlawed or exiled or in any way destroyed, nor will we pass upon, nor will we
send upon him except by the lawful judgment of his peers and the law of the land." 17 John
(Magna Charta) ch. 39 (1215). See L. MOORE, THE JURY: TOOL OF KINGS, PALLADIUM OF
LIBERTY 49-51 (1978).
132. The sixth amendment provides in part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury .. " U.S. CONST.
amend. VI. The right to an impartial jury was held applicable to the states in Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
133. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 147-49 (1968); United States ex rel. Maldo-
nado v. Denno, 239 F. Supp. 851, 854, aff'd, 348 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied sub
nom. Diblasi v. McMann, 384 U.S. 1007 (1966); People v. Bannerman, 59 A.D.2d 719, 720,
398 N.Y.S.2d 370, 371-72 (1977).
134. 37 N.Y.2d 575, 582, 338 N.E.2d 606, 612, 376 N.Y.S.2d 93, 101, cert. denied, 424
U.S. 968 (1976).
135. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938); Brown v.
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the attorney/priest who desires to wear his clerical collar at trial,
the inquiry must be whether it is possible to conciliate the state's
interest with the individual's and if conciliation is not possible
whether there exists an alternate form of regulation.
During the due process and civil rights explosions of the last
twenty years, certain constitutional rights have been expanded un-
til seemingly unrelated rights have collided. Courts have been
forced to tread very lightly between conflicting amendments. In or-
der to provide examples of judicial attempts to resolve these di-
lemmas, this Comment will explore two conflicts. First, the friction
between the sixth amendment right to a fair trial and the first
amendment guarantee of freedom of the press which recently has
been energetically litigated will be examined. Second, the conflict
between the first amendment right to free exercise and the four-
teenth amendment guarantee of equal protection under the law
will be discussed.
A. Fair Trial/Free Press
The fair trial/free press battle has been waged on a number of
fronts,3 6 but only the attempts to gag the press are relevant to this
Comment since the issue of prejudicial pretrial publicity ultimately
bears on the jurors ability to render impartial decisions. The Su-
preme Court has not issued any categorical statement on the rela-
tive position of the two rights. Indeed, it has stated, "[tihe authors
of the Bill of Rights did not undertake to assign priorities as be-
tween the First Amendment and Sixth Amendment rights, ranking
one as superior to the other. . . .It is unnecessary after nearly two
centuries, to establish a priority applicable in all circumstances."1 8 7
The Supreme Court dealt with the propriety of a gag order in
Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart."' The judge presiding over
the trial of defendants, accused of murdering a Nebraska family,
had issued a court order prohibiting the reporting of any in-court
testimony. The judge also required the adherence to the thereto-
McGinnis, 10 N.Y.2d 531, 536, 180 N.E.2d 791, 793, 225 N.Y.S.2d 497, 500 (1962).
136. See Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 444 U.S. 896 (1980) (public and press have
first amendment right of access to criminal trials); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972)
(subpoenaing of reporter's notes).




fore voluntary press guidelines which prohibited reporting of con-
fessions, opinions of guilt or innocence, or any statements that
might influence the outcome of the trial.' e The Supreme Court, in
reversing the Nebraska Supreme Court, found that despite the va-
lidity of the trial judge's assessment that there would be intense
and pervasive pretrial publicity and that such publicity might im-
pair the defendant's right to a fair trial, the gag order was uncon-
stitutional. 40 The Court indicated that alternative measures
should have been tried first. These included 1) change of venue, 2)
postponement of the trial, 3) searching questioning during voir
dire of prospective jurors, and 4) the use of emphatic and clear
instructions on the sworn duty of each juror to decide the issues
only on the evidence presented in open court."'
Where pretrial publicity has been a problem, rigorous voir dire
has been recognized as a remedy. Defendants, claiming they had
been denied a fair trial on the basis of jury bias due to unfair pre-
trial publicity, have attempted to sustain these claims by reference
to the voir dire testimony of the jurors. Where voir dire has been
found inadequate to counteract the prejudice, convictions have
been reversed 4" and remanded. 4" In other instances, despite the
existence of prejudicial pretrial publicity, voir dire has been found
to be effective in neutralizing the effect of such prejudice. 44
While voir dire has been shown to be an effective remedy against
prejudicial pretrial publicity, the question remains whether voir
dire could mitigate the prejudice engendered by the appearance of
an attorney in clerical garb.
B. Free Exercise/Equal Protection
A second area of incipient constitutional conflict lies between the
free exercise clause of the first amendment and the guarantee of
139. Id. at 542-43 n.1.
140. Id. at 562-70. The Court noted that "[tihe impact of such publicity on prospective
jurors was of necessity speculative, dealing, as [the trial court] was with factors unknown
and unknowable." Id. at 563.
141. Id. at 563-65. The latter two would also apply to the situation of an attorney wear-
ing a clerical collar in a courtroom.
142. Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 725-27 (1963).
143. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 727-29 (1961).
144. Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794 (1975); United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31,
69-71 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied sub nom. Mitchell v. United States, 431 U.S. 933 (1977).
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equal' protection under the law provided by the fourteenth amend-
ment, particularly as it relates to racial discrimination. 1 5 This con-
flict has arisen most often when southern communities have estab-
lished private segregated schools in response to the enforcement of
the public school desegregation decision, Brown v. Board of
Education.46
The Supreme Court first noted this conflict in Runyon v. Mc-
Crary.14 7 In Runyon, black children were denied admission to pri-
vate schools on the basis of their race. The Court, relying on sec-
tion one of the Civil Rights Act of 1866,14" which forbade
discrimination in the making of contracts, held that commercially
operated, non-sectarian schools could not use race as a criterion for
denying admission to prospective students. " 9 The Court specifi-
cally stated, however, that it was not reaching the question
whether section 1981 applied to private sectarian schools that
practice racial exclusion on religious grounds. 50
In Brown v. Dade Christian Schools, Inc., 51 black parents at-
tempted to enroll their children in the Dade Christian Schools. Af-
ter having been handed a printed card which read: "We are
sorry. . . .But the policy of the school is one of non-integration
and we would request that you respect this policy. [Signed] School
Administration," the parents brought suit against the school rely-
145. See generally Comment, Developments in the Law-Section 1981, 15 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. REv. 29, 191-96 (1980); Note, Racial Exclusion by Religious Schools: Brown v.
Dade Christian Schools, Inc., 91 HARV. L. REV. 879 (1978); Note, Segregation Academies
and State Action, 82 YALE L.J. 1436 (1973). For a discussion of the government's attempt to
curtail segregation academies through the denial of tax exempt status by the Internal Reve-
nue Service, see Neuberger and Crumplar, Tax Exempt Religious Schools Under Attack:
Conflicting Goals of Religious Freedom and Racial Integration, 48 FORDHAM L. REV. 229
(1979).
146. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
147. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
148. The Civil Rights Act of 1866 is presently codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which
provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in
every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evi-
dence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of
persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like
punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no
other.
149. 427 U.S. at 168-75.
150. Id. at 167-68.
151. 556 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1063 (1978).
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ing on section 1981."'
The Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, faced the question left open in
Runyon. A six-judge plurality held that Runyon v. McCrary con-
trolled because no showing had been made that the segregation
was religiously based.158 Six judges dissented, arguing that the seg-
regation was religious in nature and therefore would have re-
manded the proceedings to the District Court for further findings
on whether section 1981 applied.'" Judge Goldberg concurred in
the judgment of the plurality although he agreed with the dissent
that the segregation in this instance was a religious practice.155 In
balancing the competing interests, Judge Goldberg in his separate
opinion, found that both the integration of schools and the re-
quirement of equal protection were sufficiently compelling to out-
weigh the free exercise rights which the Dade Christian Schools
had asserted. 15" The Judge observed that the schools' belief in seg-
regation was a "very minor" element of the religion, the infringe-
ment of which would endanger neither salvation nor the schools'
survival. In distinguishing the governmental interest in desegrega-
tion of schools from other governmental interests which had been
weighed against free exercise, such as compulsory education 57 or a
uniform day of rest,15 8 Judge Goldberg noted that in the other in-
stances, the government interest merely reflected legislative prefer-
ences whereas desegregation draws its legitimacy directly from the
Constitution. 5 9 Furthermore, in contrast to the other instances,
here no less restrictive alternative was available to enforce desegre-
gation. Judge Goldberg's close examination of both the governmen-
tal and religious interests mirrors the approach prescribed by the
Supreme Court, while the analysis also exhibits the requisite defer-
ence that both interests deserve. Although balancing two funda-
mental rights is an arduous task, this should not dissuade courts
152. Id. at 311.
153. Id. at 312-14.
154. Id. at 324-26.
155. Id. at 314.
156. Id. at 322-24.
157. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
158. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
159. 556 F.2d at 322-23. The thirteenth amendment provides in part: "Neither slavery
nor involuntary servitude. . . shall exist within the United States. . . . Congress shall have
the power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation." U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
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from proceeding with such an inquiry.
The free exercise/equal protection conflict has recently arisen in
Fiedler v. Marumsco Christian School.18 0 In Fiedler, the funda-
mentalist Marumsco Baptist Church expelled from the church
school a fourteen year old white girl who refused to end a "roman-
tic relationship" with a fourteen year old black classmate. 161 Al-
though the school had been integrated since its opening in 1972
and had always encouraged friendship among the races, the minis-
ter, who served as school principal, had firm religious convictions
based on his interpretation of the Bible against interracial ro-
mance, dating and marriage. The parents of the expelled child
brought suit against the church relying on section 1981 and the
thirteenth amendment.1 62
Following the Supreme Court's free exercise analysis, the federal
district court found first, that the church's views on interracial ro-
mance were both "religious" in nature and sincerely held.1'3 The
district court further found that to grant plaintiff's request to re-
admit the girl would result in a substantial limitation on defen-
dants' free exercise rights. Despite the reliance on section 1981 and
the thirteenth amendment, the court found "no compelling state
interest" which would override the defendants' first amendment
rights."'
The Fourth Circuit reversed on appeal. Following the rationale
of Brown v. Dade Christian Schools, Inc., 6 the Fourth Circuit
avoided the direct conflict of the free exercise clause and section
1981 by finding that the personal religious convictions of individu-
als within the church should not be imputed to the church as an
institution for the purpose of first amendment protection. "
Therefore, since no religious beliefs were at issue, the matter was
determinable under the rule of Runyon v. McCrary, which applied
160. No. 79-1556 (4th Cir. Oct. 10, 1980), rev'g 486 F. Supp. 960 (E.D. Va. 1979).
161. No. 79-1556, slip op. at 3-6 (4th Cir. Oct. 10, 1980).
162. 486 F. Supp. 960, 962 (1979).
163. Id. at 965.
164. But see Goldsboro Christian Schools, Inc. v. United States, 436 F. Supp. 1314, 1321
(E.D.N.C. 1977) (where the court found that the federal policy in support of integration
outweighed any religious interest in segregation.
165. See notes 151-59 supra and accompanying text.
166. No. 79-1556, slip op. at 19-20 (4th Cir. Oct. 10, 1980).
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section 1981 to private non-sectarian schools. 10 7
Fiedler is a clear example of how conscientious, deeply-held reli-
gious beliefs may conflict with the most fundamental societal goals.
Despite the judicial quandaries which such conflicts can create, an
energetic inquiry must be made into the importance of the govern-
mental interest and the religious Practice. The inquiry into the re-
ligious practice must examine it in both its personal and institu-
tional contexts. Such inquiries, in conjunction with the effective
utilization of a least restrictive alternative where appropriate,
should bring a result which is the least intrusive on the individual's
religious freedoms. In his concurring opinion in Brown v. Dade
Christian Schools, Inc., Judge Goldberg suggested that a govern-
mental interest, which is constitutionally based,' be given greater
weight than one which is merely statutory.1 " In light of the contin-
ued conflict between constitutional amendments, this idea may be
a useful addition to free exercise analysis.
IV. Voir Dire
A principal concern of this Comment is to determine whether a
voir dire examination can serve as the least burdensome means of
eliminating whatever prejudice may be engenderd by an attorney/
priest wearing his clerical collar before a jury. While empirical
studies analyzing the usefulness of voir dire have been inconclu-
sive,169 an increasing number of courts have exhibited sufficient re-
167. See notes 147-50 supra and accompanying text.
168. See notes 155-59 supra and accompanying text.
169. Attempts to ascertain by empirical investigation the usefulness of voir dire have
yielded mixed results. The results of an early study were unequivocal. "Voir dire is grossly
ineffective as a screening mechanism." Broeder, Voir Dire Examinations: As Empirical
Study, 38 So. CAL. L. REV. 503, 528 (1965). Those results, however, must be viewed in the
context of the experiment. The examinations were conducted in the Midwest, where jurors
were selected by the "key man" system. Under this method, a local civic leader, the "key
man," was chosen. He would then recommend other persons for jury duty. The resulting
venires were largely homogeneous as to basic values and were not truly a cross-section of the
community. Intensive voir dire was an exercise in futility since one juror was very much like
another. In addition, the court where the examinations were held was hostile toward pro-
longed voir dire examinations. This was well known to the trial bar who naturally had no
desire to irritate the judge before whom they were trying a case. Id. at 503-06.
The Fair Trial-Free Press Project of the Columbia University Bureau of Applied Social
Research examined effects of prejudicial pretrial publicity. The researchers attempted to
discover who is susceptible to such information and possible means of counteracting
prejudice. In a series of experiments aimed at gauging the effectiveness of voir dire, the
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spect for the effectiveness of the procedure to indicate that voir
dire can neutralize jury prejudice.
As voir dire existed at common law in England, the only ques-
tions considered proper were those aimed at establishing "specific
biases," for example, a relationship between the prospective juror
and the defendant of family, blood or economic interest.17 0 The
first thorough examination of the scope and utility of voir dire af-
ter the American Revolution was provided by Chief Justice John
Marshall, sitting as trial judge in the treason trial of Aaron Burr.17 1
The Chief Justice enlarged the scope of voir dire beyond its En-
glish limitations when he accepted as good cause for challenge a
showing of non-specific bias. Under the circumstances this meant
showing that certain jurors had formed opinions concerning ele-
ments of the accusation before the commencement of the trial."72
Thus, the court found that one who had formed an opinion as to
the guilt or innocence of the accused could not be impartial.17 3
The Supreme Court retreated from the position that jurors with
opinions could not be impartial in Reynolds v. United States.17
Despite the fact that two jurors admitted having formed an opin-
ion, the trial court denied the challenges for cause and was af-
firmed on appeal by the Supreme Court. 75 Although noting that
an impartial juror must" 'be indifferent as he stands unsworn,' ",170
the Court found that with the proliferation of universal education
project found that "voir dire seems to reduce the effects of prejudicial information and to
sensitize jurors to examine all sets of facts and arguments in a trial." Padawar-Singer,
Singer & Singer, Voir Dire by Two Lawyers: An Essential Safeguard, 57 JuD. 386, 389
(1974). The study showed that jurors exposed to pretrial publicity and not selected with the
aid of voir dire were 20% more likely to reach a verdict of guilty in a close case. Id.
170. Gutman, The Attorney-Conducted Voir Dire of Jurors: A Constitutional Right, 39
BROOKLYN L. REV. 290, 294 (1972). See generally Moore, Voir Dire Examinations of Jurors,
Part I: The English Practice, 16 GEo. L.J. 438 (1928).
171. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 49 (No. 14,692g) (C.C.D. Va. 1807).
172. Id. at 50. The Chief Justice noted: "It would be strange if the law would be so
solicitous to secure a fair trial as to exclude a distant, unknown relative from the jury, and
yet be totally regardless of those in whose minds feelings existed much more unfavorable to
an impartial decision of the case."
173. Id. at 52. Although the holding was only by a lower federal court and was contrary
to the weight of authority on the issue, the ruling in Burr eventually became the accepted
authority based on Marshall's reputation and the persuasiveness of the opinion.
174. 98 U.S. 145 (1878). See notes 14-18 supra and accompanying text.
175. 98 U.S. at 156-57.
176. Id. at 154 (quoting Co. Litt. 155(b)).
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and newspapers, the formation of every opinion need not result in
the juror's losing his impartiality. In order for a reviewing court to
set aside the finding of a trial court on the basis of juror bias, the
Supreme Court held that a petitioner would have to demonstrate
that the error was "manifest.'7
Recent Supreme Court decisions indicate that voir dire can be
most useful in determining whether a prospective juror harbors ra-
cial prejudices. In Ham v. South Carolina,178 the Supreme Court
found that a trial judge's refusal to inquire into the racial views of
jurors where the defendant was a civil rights activist who claimed
to have been framed on drug charges constituted a violation of the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 1 9 Justice Rehn-
quist, writing for the Court, stated that the "essential demands of
fairness" together with the special emphasis that the fourteenth
amendment places on racial discrimination, required the trial
judge to have interrogated the prospective jurors on the issue of
racial prejudice. 80 Although the Supreme Court has more recently
held that every refusal by a trial judge to pose questions in voir
dire on racial views is not a constitutional violation, 8' the cases do
demonstrate that the Court considers voir dire an effective tool for
the elimination of prejudiced jurors.
In Ristaino v. Ross,' 8" the Supreme Court found that a judge
had not abused his discretion by asking only general questions re-
garding prejudice rather than the specific racially-focused ques-
tions demanded by counsel.' 8 Nevertheless, the Court advised that
"the wiser course generally is to propound appropriate questions
designed to identify racial prejudice if requested by the defen-
dant." 4 Moreover, there is a possibility that a fourteenth amend-
ment violation for failure to pose such questions could occur as in
Ham, if racial factors were shown to be significant to the case at
bar.
177. Id. at 155.
178. 409 U.S. 524 (1973).
179. Id. at 524-29.
180. Id. at 526-27.
181. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 138-40 (1974); Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589
(1976). See, e.g., United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 136-43 (2d Cir. 1979).
182. 424 U.S. 589 (1976).
183. Id. at 597-98.
184. Id. at 597 n.9.
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Although Ham and Ristaino discuss whether questions concern-
ing racial prejudice in voir dire are constitutionally required, the
mere fact that questioning has been deemed worthy of Supreme
Court review indicates the Court's belief in the utility of voir dire
as the proper vehicle for eliminating certain types of jury
prejudice. 8 '
V. Conclusion
The free exercise clause shields from governmental interference
an individual's ability to serve whatever primal religious force
guides and nurtures him. Although it is well-settled that a person's
freedom to practice his religion is not absolute and may be in-
fringed under certain circumstances, the Supreme Court has
placed on the states the heavy burden of demonstrating a com-
pelling state interest if any incidental burden on religious freedom
is to be justified. In addition, as with the infringement of other
first amendment freedoms, it is incumbent upon the states to in-
trude upon the right in the least obtrusive manner.
Individuals asserting free exercise claims place a peculiar burden
on the courts because of the difficulty of adjudicating matters in
which the litigants are ascribing their actions to "higher law."
Courts have particular difficulty when a free exercise assertion
intersects with the judicial process. When a problem in this vein
arises, such as an attorney who is also a priest, claiming the right
to wear his collar in court, courts must refrain from resolving the
matter as if it were simply a question of judicial housecleaning.
The free exercise analysis as prescribed by the Supreme Court and
185. Religion has been recognized as a proper subject for voir dire questioning when it is
relevant to the proceedings. In Yarborough v. United States, 230 F.2d 56, 63 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 351 U.S. 969 (1956), the defendant, who had been charged with tax evasion, main-
tained that he had been prejudiced by the trial judge's refusal to make inquiries at voir dire
as to the jurors' religious affiliations. The Fourth Circuit found that the trial judge did not
abuse his discretion in refusing to voir dire the jurors because the issue of religion was not
present. The charge was tax evasion and defendant belonged to no particular religious sect.
Moreover, defendant in Yarborough failed to show how he had been prejudiced by the
judge's refusal to pose questions regarding the jurors' religious affiliations; had the matter
been relevant the question would have been allowed as in United States v. Daily, 139 F.2d 7
(7th Cir. 1943). In Daily, the defendant, charged with draft evasion, argued that his position
as a Jehovah's Witness minister should allow him to voir dire the jurors on their religious
beliefs. The Seventh Circuit found that questions inquiring into any prejudice against Jeho-
vah's Witnesses were proper under the circumstances. Id. at 9.
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developed by the lower federal courts must be brought to bear on
the matter. Assuming a finding that the practice is religious and
that the practitioner is sincere, exhaustive analysis must be made
of three factors in particular: 1) the centrality of the practice to the
individual and to his religion; 2) the importance of the governmen-
tal interest asserted as compelling; and 3) should the governmental
interest be deemed sufficiently compelling to overcome the free ex-
ercise right, whether the government has satisfied its goal in the
least restrictive manner possible. Only if this analysis is followed,
giving each element its requisite deference, will the goal be
achieved of optimal free exercise rights for all.
Jeffrey Glassman

